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A Course on the Introduction to Law

ACourse on the Introduction to Law
By BERNARD C. GAVIT

Professor of Law and Dean, Indiana University School of Law

[Paner read before the Round Table on Law School Objectives and Methods
of the Association of American Law Schools at its meeting in New Orleans,
December 28, 1935.]

I.
A

recent survey by the Committee on
Curriculum of the Association of
American Law Schools in connection
with an Introductory Course in Law
gives evidence of considerable interest on
the subject. Responses were received
from seventy-five per cent. of the Association schools, so that the expression
of opinion on the subject can certainly
be accepted as representative.
With few exceptions the schools answered that a conscious effort should be
made to introduce students to the study
of law. A majority thought that the desired results could be best accomplished
through the use of separate courses in
the various fields covered or in connection with the usual beginning courses.
Practically all of the rest thought that
one course would be advisable. About a
dozen of the schools answering had such
a course. The hours given to it varied
from one to five semester hours.
A number of schools had abandoned
previous efforts along this line. The
reason given was, in substance, that the
work was too general. Apparently what
had been tried was a broad orientation
program based primarily upon a lecture
method and text materials. In some
instances it had been presented by the
attempted co-operative efforts of several
members of the faculty. It had been
concluded that the efforts were sufficiently unproductive to warrant the discontinuance of the effort.
Most of those who expressed an opinion of doubt or conviction as to the in-

advisability of a definite project on the
subject asserted that such a program
must be too general to be of value and
that the only way to begin to learn law
was to be completely immersed in it.
Several expressed the matter substantially in this manner: "The only way to
learn to swim is to get into the water."
A number asserted that there was no
time available for such a course. Others recognized that the course must finally become one in elementary legal philosophy and insisted that legal philosophy
can best, or only: be taught in the third
or fourth year of a law student's career.
It was said also that the historical aspect of an introductory course is adequately dealt with in the usual first-year
courses.
II.
The objection based on the time element is most easily disposed of. In
final analysis there is always involved
in curriculum matters a judgment as to
comparative values. The final allotment
of the three years of time to the courses
included in the curriculum is based upon a conscious or an unconscious decision as to comparative worth as between
the courses included and as against the
subject-matter excluded. The objection
that there is no time for an introductory
course is of itself invalid. It may well
be that on the merits we ought to make
room for it. The objection is at best a
decision against its worth on a comparative basis. It is at worst an excuse
for refusing to consider the problem of
its inclusion.
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It is worth noting in this connection
that there has been a considerable increase in the number of hours required
in the first year of law school work and
the total number of hours required for
graduation.
Only three Association
schools now require but twenty-four semester hours of work in the first year,
and only five require but seventy-two
semester hours of credit for graduation.
A very considerable number of schools
require thirty semester hours in the first
year. A good many require twentyeight. The average for all the schools
of the Association is 28.3. The average
required for graduation is 79.83.
There is therefore substantial opinion
to the effect that the first-year curriculum
can be increased to thirty semester hours.
The actual distribution often favors a
larger load in the first semester, for example, 16-14, 17-13, or 15-13. Most of
the increase has in fact been occasioned
by the inclusion in the first semester of
the first year of courses on Court Organization, Legal History, Legal Ethics,
and Introduction to Law.
The practice is a recognition of the
rather obvious truth that the beginning
law school student can very profitably
spend more hours in the classroom than
he can later on. During the first year
and particularly the first half of it the
burden is on the instructor. The ground
covered is necessarily less than in the
second and third year courses. There is
little in the way of independent work and
outside reading which the 'beginning student can do to any real advantage. He
usually enters law school with energy
and enthusiasm to spare, and it is extremely wise to take advantage of them.
A substantial number of schools have
made room and found time for a definite
project on the subject. The student load
for the first semester has been increased
to fifteen or sixteen hours, so that the
usual first-year work is not necessarily
cut to take care of it.
Whether or not there is time for an
introductory course depends, therefore,

on whether or not it merits the necessar
time.
The answer to the argument that such
a course must be too general to be of
value is likewise rather self-evident. The
past experience on that point is not very
conclusive. If the previous courses were
too general, the obvious remedy is to
make them more specific. If lecture
methods and text materials were ineffective, why not try the case method?
There is no apparent compulsion to a too
general course or even a general course.
If the subject admits of generalities under all of the accepted rules of logic
and experience, it necessarily admits of
detailed and specific subject-matters, because it is out of the latter that generalities should be drawn.
III.
The assertion that legal philosophy
can only be taught to third and fourth
year students is not axiomatic in character. How do we know that? My own
limited experience convinces me that the
exact opposite is true. I have attempted
to teach something of the judicial function and process to third-year classes.
Those students were more or less completely immune to it. I have used exactly
the same materials on first-year classes
with much better and even encouraging
results. The reasons after all are rather
obvious, and they involve the real merits and necessity for a thorough and
broad introductory course..
There is obvious truth in the statements made in answer to the committee's
questionnaire to the general effect that legal history, court organization, and the
other more generally accepted elements
of an introductory course are taught in
the regular first-year courses. It is literally true that all beginning courses in law
are necessarily introductory in their nature. They can be nothing else. A student
who succeeds in getting through the first
year's work will have picked up considerable of the historical facts about
law and its administration. The altogether sad fact is that he also will have
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picked up the common-law philosophy of
a natural law and its accompanying
eigrhteenth and nineteenth century philosophies in the fields of economics, psychology, sociology, and government as
they have been understood by the judges
of the past. In ninety-nine cases out of
a hundred he is quite likely and more or
less inevitably bound to turn out to be
just one more dogmatist.
I know of no persuasive reason why a
definite attempt should not be made to
co-ordinate and integrate the historical
materials and to introduce a student of
the law to a broader foundation than
he is likely to pick up for himself. A
homemade legal philosophy is a brew of
dangerous possibilities.
It is undoubtedly true that, if an ablebodied man be thrown into a pool of water, he will manage to get out or drown.
Either of those alternatives may, however, be a calamity. There is little if
any force to the assumption that, as
to the one who drowned, there was a particularly fortunate stroke of divine providence. And I think common experience
demonstrates that, as to the one who
crawls out, the results are not always
cause for thanksgiving. Indeed, so far
as I know, no one interested in producing good swimmers does business that
way. From the beginning, a good leal
of attention is paid to the accepted theory and the better practice on the subject. I expect that if a survey were
made of teaching in other fields, it would
be found that the legal field is the only
one where a conscious effort is made not
to teach the beginner. Trial by battle is
considered somewhat antiquated by almost every one except lawyers.
One can accept if he wishes the smug

unreality that the products of the law
schools in the past have been adequately
prepared. The truth is, however, that a
great many of our ills, public and private, have arisen directly from the crudities of legal education. The dogmatic
unsocial unscientific lawyer had no real
chance to be anything else. Ile was
taught or allowed to believe too much
which was not so. Indeed almost every-

thing he "knew" or "knows" is substantially false.
It is indeed strange that modern law
schools should insist on teaching the legal
philosophy of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. If -one makes no
effort to repudiate it, the student necessarily absorbs it. Once absorbed, it is
so satisfying and easy that it cannot be
displaced except in rare instances.
What is the justification for a law
school actually devoted to the ideals of
a trade school whatever its pretensions
on the subject may be? So far as the
schools which depend upon moneys from
taxation and charitable endowment for
their existence are concerncd there is a
betrayal of trust if the public aspect of
the legal profession is not actively pressed in the curriculum, not by indirection
but directly. A broad foundation, a tolerant outlook, a scientific attitude, so
cial and professional action, these come
not by accident but by selection and
training. At least to disregard them is
disastrous. To struggle with them is
hopeful.
Legal education should be
turned over to the commercial enterprises unless the struggle is to be undertaken.
IV.
Following is an outline of an introductory course which the author has given three times:
Chapter
I. Common Law Procedure
I. The Briefing of ('ases and the Use of
Law Books

III. The Court System and Organization

See.

1. The Historical I)evelopment and
Present Arrangement

IV.
V.

2. The Court as an Entity
3. The Jury
4. The Lawyer
What Is Law?
Some Accepted Legal Concepts and
Classifications
1. In General
2. Rights, Powers, Privileges, and
Immunities
3. Legal Classifieations
(a) In General
(b) Procedure
(e) Substanee
(d) Jnrlsdli-tion
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Chapter
VI. Sources and Forms of Law
VII. The Historical Development of the
Common Law and Equity
1. In General
2. The Common Law Actions
3. The Common Law Supplemented
by Equity
VIII. The Judicial Function
1. As to Individuals
2. As to Jurisdiction of Courts
3. As to Other Governmental Agencies
(a) In General
(b) Legislative Investigation
(c) Interpretative,
Curative
Acts, and Special Legislation
(d) Direct Legislative Interference
(e) Legislative Contempt
(f) Executive Exercise of Judicial Power
(g) Exercise of Judicial Power
by Parties
(h) Legislative Imposition of
Nonjudicial Power
(i) Legislative Deprivation of
Judicial Power
(j) Court Assumption of Nonjudicial Power
IX. The Judicial Process
1. The Matter of Language
2. The Matter of Fiction
S. The Matter of Logic
4. The Matter of Ignorance and Prejudice
5. The Matter of Precedent
6. The Matter of Statutes and Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation
(a) The Mechanics of Legislation
(b) Statutory Interpretation
(1) Repeal
(2) As against Common
Law
(3) As against Criminal
Law
(4) Adoption
of Prior
Construction
(5) The "Intention of the
Legislature"
(6) Rules of Interpretation
(c) Constitutional
Interpretation

Five semester hours have been given
to the course. In addition a one-hour
course in the Legal Profession has been
required. For next year it is planned to
put the materials on this latter subject

into the introductory course and to devote five semester hours to the combined
project. By eliminating duplications in
those two courses, by minimizing fhe
Use of Law Books and reserving its detailed presentation to the second and
third year, and by adding a few additional hours at the beginning of the semester, the subject-matter can be thoroughly covered in five hours. With a
beginning student load of fifteen hours,
the balance of the accepted beginning
curriculum is not adversely affected.
Except as to the chapters on Common
Law Procedure and the Briefing of Cases
and the Use of Law Books, the materials used are cases, statutes, and law
review articles. In the preliminary presentation of those first two subject-matters, the materials used are entirely texts.
My own experience has convinced me
that it is wasted effort to teach the details of procedure to the beginning student. He needs to know something
about procedure in order to read his
cases with some understanding. This
can be done by lecture and text at the
very beginning. The matter can be amplified and illustrated later on through
the materials on Common Law Actions.
Each case there presents some accepted
common-law procedure. By discussing
the procedural technic used in those cases
as a preliminary step in the classroom
work on that subject, the beginning student can be taught all he need to know
about procedure. The place of procedure in the judicial process can be stressed there as well as later on, but it is
unnecessary to deal with the details of
procedural law to develop that point.
The law of procedure can best be taught
in the third year. It is a subject-matter
whose intimate knowledge is immediately necessary to the beginning lawyer, and
one which arouses in the third-year student considerable interest. Here at last
is something that is practical! (That
is a student utterance, not mine.)
Doubtless there is some diversity of
opinion as to the proper contents of an
introductory course. The differences are
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not as great as might be imagined. A
survey of the situation reveals that those
most actively engaged in the development of the project have come out at
about the same place. There is common
agreement on the inclusion of materials
on procedure, court organization (including the legal profession), and the historical development of the law (using the
Common Law Actions as a base). There
is some agreement on the inclusion of
materials on the source and forms of
law and the judicial function, including

the doctrine of the separation of powers
and the supremacy of the courts. My
own opinion still is that the greatest contribution such a course can make is by
the inclusion in it of materials on the
judicial process and legal philosophy.
There can be no sane hope that every
law school graduate can be developed into a Holmes. But quite obviously much
is to be gained by a conscious and vigorous attempt to contribute to students
some understanding of law and its administration.

An Experiment in Moot Court Work
By WILLIAM M. BLATT
Lecturer in Law, Boston University

T

hasBoston
been experimenting
with of
a moot
he
University School
Law
court system which closely approximates
real court trials and has apparently additional scientific value. These experiments have reached a stage of practical
satisfaction, and are both in teaching results and in arousing the enthusiasm of
the students so successful that they seem
to be worth recording.
The method employed in the past in
this school, and probably in most other
law schools, has been the trial based on
an agreed statement of facts. This statement, involving one unsettled point of
law, is made up by an instructor and given to two student counsel. Witnesses
are assigned who read or learn their
testimony, and are examined by counsel.
In some schools the counsel do not know
what the witnesses will say, and some
attempt is made to create a trial problem
by having witnesses contradict each other on questions of fact. No trial atmosphere is created, however, because
the result is a foregone conclusion, and
3

the witnesses have learned their lessons
from a slip of paper and the issue of
law is framed in advance. The students go through the performance with
an obviously artificial make-believe air,
and the whole process has an automatic
mock-trial effect.
In the new method which I have worked out and put into practice a scene
from real life is written out like a movie
scenario. Every word, act, and circumstance is written down, and the scenario
is given to an assistant, usually the Clerk
of the Moot Court. The scenario is an
episode upon which legal proceedings are
instituted. They contain several matters
which constitute defenses or apparent defenses and other matters which avoid or
seem to avoid the defenses. Law question, some settled and at least one not
well settled, are also involved. The
scene or scenes of the incident or incidents (there may be more than one)
are set forth, the parties are named and
the documents needed are described, also
such properties as are needed. The form
of action is also stated.

